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BALANCING UNEQUAL TRADING RELATIONSHIPS: TRANSACTION AVOIDANCE PRECEPTS AS A 




In the field of insolvency law, the transaction avoidance regime protects creditors from improper 
actions of insolvent debtors. There is however increasing public awareness that the solvency of small 
business creditors may be stretched by actions of their larger debtors. This undermines governmental 
measures to support small businesses. It also has negative implications for the transaction avoidance 
regime, which has undergone expansion through the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015 reforms. The value of these reforms is deflated where small businesses have entered 
administration/liquidation because their finances have been overborne by the trading practices of 
larger partners, and established insolvency law remedies for overturning transactions cannot be 
invoked to return any lost value to the estate. The absence of such remedies, together with the 
weakness of other mechanisms relied on for the protection of smaller businesses, lead this paper to 
propose that tenets of transaction avoidance law offer a route to discerning circumstances in which 
contractual arrangements with large counterparties should be unravelled in the interests of 
strengthening the protection of small businesses. 
 
A.  Introduction 
United Kingdom news headlines between 2013-2016 carried several stories exposing pressurised 
relationships between large manufacturing/retail organisations and suppliers. These revelations 
coincided with legislative developments aimed at providing a boost for small businesses. These 
legislative developments, in turn, emerged contemporaneously with measures enhancing the 
insolvency law regime’s capacity to challenge misconduct by directors and overturn improper 
transactions. The insolvency reforms do not form part of the agenda to support small businesses, but 
revelations regarding the tribulations experienced by small businesses in relation to larger trading 
partners strike a chord with the transaction avoidance regime’s goal to promote commercial morality1 
by ‘discouraging inappropriate behaviour’.2 This convergence of developments also raises questions 
regarding whether commercial morality can be extended beyond the insolvency context into the full 
range of dealings by market actors, as a means of addressing the imbalance in relationships between 
small businesses and larger trading partners.  
Key reasons for exploring this possibility are that controlling the behaviour of dominant market actors 
could prevent small business insolvencies: as discussed below, powerful trading partners can exert 
pressure on small business creditors in ways that trigger the latter’s financial distress and reduce funds 
available for distribution to their own creditors in insolvency proceedings.  Secondly, whereas 
transaction avoidance law corrects distortions brought about by colourable transactions entered into 
                                                          
1 Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee Cmnd 8558 (1982) – paragraphs 235, 238.   
2 D. Milman, ‘Transactional Avoidance: Disrupting Unsound Corporate Dealings’ 2010 C.L.N. 1, 2.  
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by an insolvent company prior to its collapse,3  if widespread conduct that erodes the value of a 
company’s estate cannot be challenged through existing transaction avoidance mechanisms in the 
event of the company’s collapse, the role of the transaction avoidance regime is undermined. 
Consequently, reforms introduced by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
(‘SBEEA’) to facilitate greater use of certain transaction avoidance remedies4 would have a limited 
impact in practice. Moreover, as seen below, traditional techniques including the regulation of late 
payments are incapable of providing a comprehensive solution to any self-serving practices,5  and thus 
do not constitute an effective alternative means of protection. In light of the increased attention 
drawn to the transaction avoidance regime by SBEEA reforms, this paper considers whether there is 
room for devising standards that are useful in determining the propriety of arrangements between 
small businesses and large counterparties, by analogy with concepts associated with this area of law. 
This would minimise insolvency risks connected with trading challenges of the nature considered 
below, and signal instances in which a powerful trading partner should curb its practices to avoid (i) 
threatening the survival of a smaller business and (ii) ‘a lowering of business standards’6. 
This paper therefore examines the context in which concern regarding difficulties experienced by 
smaller businesses has gained attention (Sections B, C, D), and the extent to which the transaction 
avoidance framework is capable of shielding small businesses from controversial practices (Section E). 
It highlights respects in which a set of standards that demarcates the boundaries of stronger parties’ 
exercise of their commercial might, can be formulated with reference to considerations attached to 
current transaction avoidance remedies (Sections F, G). It draws conclusions regarding the benefits, 
of establishing a more cohesive relationship between protection of small businesses and the role of 
the transaction avoidance regime (Section H).   
 
B. Background 
In 2014, news articles revealed that a major food producer had requested ‘investment payments’ from 
suppliers in exchange for continued custom, failing which they would be ‘nominated for de-list’.7 
Payment amounts were as high as £70,000, with the company’s receipts totalling low millions.8 The 
suppliers’ reaction is captured in comments ‘They know you can’t afford solicitors to fight them’, ‘It's 
like a gun held to your head’.9  
Such ‘pay and stay’ practices are not uncommon in manufacturing and retail,10 as illustrated by an 
investigation by the Groceries Code Adjudicator (‘GCA’11) into allegations of that one of the largest UK 
supermarket chains had requested lump sum payments from suppliers. The GCA found that only some 
of this organisation’s demands stemmed from contractual agreements between itself and its 
                                                          
3 Re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] Ch. 223, 230. 
4 s.118 SBEEA (246ZD Insolvency Act 1986). 
5 C. Cowton and L. San-Jose, ‘On the Ethics of Trade Credit: Understanding Good Payment Practice in the 
Supply  Chain’ (2016) J.B.E. 673, 675-676. 
6 Cork Report (n.1), paragraph 238.  






suppliers, and many requests for payments ‘were made with an implication of detriment if any 
supplier declined to contribute’.12 The GCA concluded that lump sum payments pertaining to future 
business between a supplier and a retailer, which had not been agreed to explicitly in the supply 
contracts, ‘were potentially an attempt by the retailer to vary the Supply Agreement’ without invoking 
any of its contractual rights to effectuate a unilateral variation of the terms of the agreement.13 
A detailed example is provided by the GCA’s report of its investigation into practices by another key 
player in the grocery sector, launched following this operator’s announcement of an over-statement 
of profits in 2014.14 Material findings were that debts acknowledged by the operator as being due to 
suppliers could go unpaid for over 12-24 months, or until abandoned by suppliers;15 that the operator 
routinely deducted or delayed payments of funds due to suppliers for goods it had received, including 
instances where there was a dispute between the parties over financial claims by the suppliers that 
did not relate to the supply of goods to the operator.16  The operator did not take timely action to 
rectify data input errors; neglect which meant suppliers were overcharged or underpaid, and 
occasioned delays in payments to suppliers of 9 months to 2 years for amounts ranging from £200,000 
to multiple millions.17  The operator issued duplicate invoices to suppliers and deducted both amounts 
from its own payments to them; errors which took up to 12 months to rectify.18 Conversely, if the 
operator identified underpayments by suppliers dating back a considerable period of time, it could 
demand settlement of its claim within a matter of weeks.19 
The findings in these investigations are supported by results of a 2015 survey, that incorrect 
deductions from invoices, incorrect demands for payments or charges going back many years, and 
demands for lump sum payments ‘over and above those agreed’, featured most prominently among 
issues experienced by suppliers.20  Suppliers were inevitably at a disadvantage in endeavouring to 
resolve such issues: incorrect deductions from invoices could be difficult to prove, and could involve 
a long wait for a refund.21 Retailers’ aggressive pursuit of payments going back a considerable period 
meant suppliers simply paid up or sought proof to the contrary among previous years’ records.22 Lump 
sum payments were often demanded to compensate for profit shortfalls, and in some instances 
retailers reduced product prices and looked to suppliers to make up the deficit.23  
                                                          
12 Code clarification: requests for lump sum payments (GCA, 2016) https://www.gov.uk/government/case-
studies/code-clarification-requests-for-lump-sum-payments 
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/code-clarification-requests-for-lump-sum-payments  
14 GCA investigation into Tesco plc final report (2016) – [3.1] and [4.1]-[4.6].  
15 Ibid, [20.2]. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, [22.1]-[22.6]. 
18 Ibid, [23.1]-[23.5].  
19 Ibid, [26.1]-[26.2]. 
20 YouGov, GCA - Annual Survey Results 2015 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/436481/2015_Conference_-
_YouGov_slides.pdf;  
YouGov, Groceries Code Adjudicator – Follow-Up Survey (2015), 4 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401525/GCA_follow_up_sur
vey.pdf 
21 Follow-Up Survey ibid, 11.  
22 Ibid, 12.  
23 Ibid, 4, 10, 11.  
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Nor are such challenges unique to the supermarket retail context: a global beer brewer ‘routinely’ 
paid suppliers’ invoices four months following fulfilment of its orders;24 and a chain of health food 
shops requested a reduction from suppliers, together with a contribution to costs of security to 
prevent product theft.25 A national department store group was said to have requested a reduction 
on suppliers’ invoices in exchange for making payment 30-60 days earlier than its standard payment 
terms,26 following disclosure of previous requests for suppliers to extend the waiting period for 
payment of invoices from a 90-day window up to 120 days, against a 42-day industry average.27 As 
trade credit is widely used by UK companies,28 issues of this nature reverberate across sectors.  
It is debatable whether these examples reflect the ‘rough and tumble’ of commerce: the GCA 
acknowledged the trading and financial difficulties experienced by one operator during the period 
under investigation, as a contributing factor to practices including the deliberate withholding of 
payments due to suppliers to enable the operator to present a stronger financial position at key 
reporting periods.29 The food producer’s ‘investment payment’ requests arose during the year it 
commenced a profound restructuring exercise to reduce its debt and pension deficit.30 The 
department store group requested extended suppliers’ payment terms was during a trading period 
marked with profit warnings.31 Evidently, major supermarket operators are also susceptible to 
onerous demands from their own muscular trading partners.32 Of the 20% of suppliers in the 2015 
survey who affirmed that they would not complain or submit disputes to the GCA, only 28% saw such 
problems as ‘a normal part of doing business’.33 For larger companies, these examples illustrate 
tensions that can arise between directors’ statutory duty to promote a company’s success, and the 
factors which they should consider in performing this duty, including ‘the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers’.34 ‘The practice of delaying payment accords with conventional 
commercial wisdom’ whereby trade debtors take as long as possible to pay, financial texts venturing 
to ‘suggest that purchasing companies should aim to stretch the credit period offered by suppliers’.35 
During recessionary periods when there is limited access to traditional sources of credit, debtors have 
stronger incentives to delay payments to creditors, converting trade credit into a cheap loan.36 
Moreover, ‘pressure on suppliers [increases] freedom of choice for consumers’,37  another 
                                                          
24 ‘AB InBev payment terms to small suppliers criticised’ BBC (18/01/15). 
25 E. Simpson, ‘Holland & Barrett accused of squeezing suppliers’ BBC (18/01/16). 
26 A. Armstrong, ‘Debenhams in new “Santa tax” row’ Telegraph (21/11/2015). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Cowton and San-Jose (n.5), 674; C. Howorth, ’Small Firms’ Demand for Finance: a Research Note’ (2001) 19 
I.S.B.J. 78, 82.  
29 GCA (n.14), [18.1]-[18.5], [25.2]-[25.4]; S. Butler, ‘Tesco delayed payments to suppliers to boost profits’ 
Guardian (26/01/16). 
30 S. Bowers and J. Kollewe, ‘Premier Foods launches £353m cash call’ Guardian (04/03/14). 
31  Armstrong, (n.26). 
32 ‘Tesco and Unilever end price war’ BBC (13/10/16).  
33 Annual Survey Results, (n.20) 14; S. Daneshku and K. Shubber, ‘Business groups hit out at late payment 
“scandal”’ Financial Times (19/01/15). 
34 Companies Act 2006 (‘CA 2006’), s.172(1)(c).  
35 Cowton and San-Jose (n.5), 675.  
36 Ibid; FSB, Time to Act: The Economic Impact of Poor Payment Practice (2016), 18; N. Cohen, ‘Suppliers lend 
£327bn to businesses in form of late payments’ Financial Times (01/06/14).  
37 C. Luetge, ‘Economics and Ethics: How to Combine Ethics and Self-Interest’, J.D. Rendtorff (ed), Power and 
Principle in the Market Place (Ashgate, 2010), 69. 
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constituency to be considered by directors promoting a company’s success.38 Nonetheless, risks 
arising from delayed payments, underpayments, withheld and improper payments may be acute for 
a financially distressed business. Insolvency practitioners have identified late payment as a ‘primary 
or major factor’ in business failures, wholesale and retail sectors being among the worst offenders.39 
Small businesses are susceptible to the demands of large clients who have power to stipulate their 
own payment terms.40  
The issues arising in this context may thus be viewed against the backdrop of ethics,41 the role of major 
companies as ‘public actors’ with power and influence that encompasses different spheres of modern 
life,42 and consistency with SBEEA reforms increasing the availability of financing options for smaller 
businesses – introduced in recognition of constraints affecting small businesses in establishing their 
creditworthiness to traditional lenders, challenger banks and alternative finance providers.43 These 
reforms, and other measures enhancing the protection of smaller businesses, are considered below. 
 
C. Developments in the agenda to promote small business interests  
The trading challenges encountered by smaller businesses intensified the focus on late payments 
regulation. Following a governmental consultation on the duty to report payment practices and 
policies, the Secretary of State can now require certain companies to publish information about 
payment practices, policies and performance in business-to-business contracts involving the supply of 
goods, services or intangible assets.44 This aims to help small businesses ‘by making the payment 
practices of businesses more transparent, incentivising improvements in payment culture, and helping 
small businesses agree fair payment terms’.45 The duty joins a long history of mechanisms whereby 
companies have publicised their payment practices, suppliers’ rights to claim interest on overdue 
payments have been strengthened, and limits have been imposed on payment periods for commercial 
debt.46 The Small Business Commissioner’s office has furthermore been established as a source of 
advice and information, and to ‘consider complaints from small businesses relating to payment 
matters in connection with the supply of goods and services to larger businesses’.47   
                                                          
38 CA 2006, s.172(1)(c). 
39 Association of Business Recovery Professionals, ‘Late payment causes 20% of insolvencies, says R3’ 
(11/04/14).  
40 Cowton and San-Jose (n.5), 675. 
41 Ibid.  
42 S. Wheeler, ‘Contracts and Corporations’, P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds), Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
Research (OUP, 2010), 130.  
43 SBEEA, Explanatory Notes paragraphs 8-18, s.5. 
44 SBEEA, s.3; Duty to Report Payment Practices and Policies (DBEIS, 2015), 3; Reporting on Payment Practices 
and Performance Regulations 2017; Limited Liability Partnerships (Reporting on Payment Practices and 
Performance) Regulations 2017. 
45 SBEEA, Explanatory Notes paragraph 91. 
46 E.g. Prompt Payers Code (CBI, 1991); Method for achieving good payment performance in commercial 
transactions BS 7890:1996 (BSI, 1996); Better Payment Practice Code (DTI, 1997); Prompt Payment Code 
(CICM, 2008); Companies Act 1985 (Directors’ Report) (Statement of Payment Practices) Regulations 1997;   
Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998; Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions OJ L 48, 23.2.2011, 
p. 1–10; Late Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations 2013. 
47 Enterprise Act 2016, s.1. 
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Although concern to protect small businesses from disadvantageous payment practices is well-
documented, Cowton and San-Jose have identified several flaws in these initiatives; namely that 
suppliers may be deterred from charging interest on overdue debts by the expense involved in 
pursuing claims against powerful customers, and the risk of damaging their commercial 
relationships.48 Comparisons of the speed with which companies pay their debts are naturally relative, 
and do not provide an objective standard from which ideal payment patterns can be ascertained.49 
Prescribed payment periods also seem arbitrary since they constitute ‘economy-wide stipulations or 
recommendations of what a generally “fair” maximum payment period might look like’ (e.g. 60 days),50 
and do not allow for sector-specific circumstances in which large customers benefit from fast 
movement of stock and receive payment for the onward sale of goods shortly after their supplies have 
been delivered – e.g. in the food retail industry.51 
It is also doubtful whether mechanisms focused on regulating payment practices offer an adequate 
means of protecting smaller businesses, for example if large organisations tend to agree specific terms 
at the outset of contractual relationships, and subsequently find ways of securing more favourable 
arrangements.52  Late payment rules are also manipulable if long credit periods are set, favouring 
debtor companies by enabling them to create an appearance of timely payment.53 This diminishes the 
likelihood of the late payments framework comprehensively addressing the difficulties encountered 
by smaller businesses. As mentioned above, the new Small Business Commissioner aims to assist small 
businesses,54 preventing a ‘”winner takes all” approach to commercial dealings which is unfair to small 
businesses’.55  The outcome of the GCA’s investigation into a leading grocery operator supports the 
argument for greater State involvement in developing commercial norms applicable to relationships 
between small and large businesses. Although the investigation was conducted before the GCA had 
any power to impose financial penalties for breaches of the Groceries Supply Code of Practice 
(‘GSCP’),56 the operator responded by taking steps to improve compliance with the GSCP.57  An 
‘overwhelming majority’ of suppliers consequently indicated that relationships with the operator had 
become more positive and they could perceive a shift towards ‘a more open and collaborative 
approach’.58 The release of the GCA’s report was therefore softened by news items confirming that 
action had since been taken to simplify the operator’s practices and improve relationships with 
suppliers.59 
                                                          
48 Cowton and San-Jose (n.5), 677; FSB (n.36), 3. 
49 Cowton and San-Jose, ibid 678. 
50 Ibid, 680.  
51 Ibid.  
52 A.  Felsted, ‘Tesco puts a brave new face on old problems’ Financial Times (21/09/15). 
53 CBI, Duty to Report on Payment Practices and Policies: CBI response to Government consultation on 
transparency in payment practices (2015), [14]; L. Conway, ‘Late Payment of Commercial Debt’ (House of 
Commons Library Research Paper 97/25, 1997), 3. 
54 Enterprise Act 2016, Part 1. 
55 Government Response: Small Business Commissioner, (DBIS, 2015) 2. 
56 Groceries Code Adjudicator (Permitted Maximum Financial Penalty) Order 2015 applies to breaches which 
occurred on/after 06/04/15; GCA (n.14), 7, [2.2], [60.1]; S. Butler, ‘Tesco must pay £1m costs for watchdog 
investigation’ Guardian (03/02/16). 
57 (n.14), [55.1]-[55.9]. 
58 Ibid, 6, [56.1] 
59  S. Neville, ‘Tesco torn apart as watchdog finds supermarket repeatedly withheld payments from suppliers’ 
Independent (27/01/16).  
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However, the implementation of the measures sketched under this heading, which can be traced back 
to the 1990s,60 raises doubts whether respect for small business interests is adequately embedded in 
the commercial culture. Suppliers are not inevitably weaker parties: the collapse of a large UK mobile 
phone retailer demonstrates the dependence of some high-profile businesses on their powerful 
suppliers.61 A Federation of Small Businesses’ (‘FSB’) survey found that 52% of members had been 
adversely affected by supplier contract terms.62 40% of respondents ‘felt powerless to do anything … 
because the supplier was too important or powerful to challenge’.63 It has also been argued that 
deeper investigation into the practices highlighted by the GCA report could reveal complicity on the 
part of larger suppliers in manipulating financial accounts and presenting their own inaccurate 
reports.64 Added to this, complex questions arise in contract law regarding the extent to which the law 
can intervene to set aside contracts on the basis that they are unfair, unconscionable, or have been 
brought about by an inequality of bargaining power.65 It is accordingly the adequacy of the legal 
framework for supporting smaller businesses that deserves attention, rather than support for 
suppliers per se. This scrutiny is in the wider interest, as small businesses constitute 99.3% of all UK 
businesses, accounting for 47% of private sector turnover and employment of 60% of the private 
sector workforce.66 Consequently, pervasive trading challenges may have ripple effects of an 
economic and social nature, including influencing small businesses’ decisions to delay hiring new staff, 
paying tax obligations, making new investments or paying their own suppliers.67 
Two recent legislative interventions will strengthen the financial position of small and medium sized 
businesses.  One is a duty for banks to provide information regarding small and medium sized business 
customers whose applications for loans or credit facilities have been rejected, to finance platforms 
that facilitate access to alternative sources of finance.68 As the alternative lending market becomes a 
prominent source of finance for smaller businesses,69 the businesses will benefit from increased 
availability of financing options as well as also a difference in approach to the lender/debtor 
relationship as non-traditional lenders are more supportive of financially distressed customers.70 The 
negative effects of companies’ financial difficulties have also been eased by amendments to the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’). These reforms have extended the statutory requirements for essential 
utility supplies to be maintained for companies in insolvency proceedings,71 to cover point-of-sale 
terminals, computer hardware/software, data storage/processing, website hosting, and information 
technology-related services.72  Continuation of business during insolvency is accordingly encouraged 
by preventing ‘suppliers of essential goods or services from relying on their insolvency-related 
                                                          
60 (n.46) instruments; Conway, (n.53); Cowton and San-Jose (n.5), 675-676. 
61 S. Read and A. Lawson, ‘Phones 4U goes into administration: Why its suppliers hung up on mobile phone 
retailer’ Independent (16/09/14). 
62 Treating Smaller Businesses Like Consumers: Unfair Contract Terms (FSB, 2016), 2. 
63 FSB, ‘Unfair contract terms costing small firms billions’ (22/08/16). 
64 A. Hilton, ‘Suppliers must come clean in Tesco scandal, too’ Evening Standard (03/02/16). 
65 S. Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th edn OUP, 2009), Chapters 11, 12. 
66 Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2016 (DBEIS), 1.  
67 FSB (n.36), 23-24. 
68 SBEEA, s.5, Explanatory Notes paragraph 91. 
69 A. Jackson, ‘Marketplace lending: a new strategy for dealing with distressed businesses’ (2016) 3 C.R.& I. 
125.  
70 Ibid.  
71 IA 1986, s.233. 
72 IA 1986, s.233A. 
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contractual terms to charge higher prices or terminate the contract’.73 The Government’s evaluation 
of the benefits of imposing these controls recognized that a substantial number of such service 
suppliers are small and medium businesses, whose ability to withdraw services or extract ‘ransom’ 
payments from customers, has been modified by the introduction of this legislation.74  Formal 
intervention of this type was justified since the ‘market power’ of essential service suppliers to hold 
businesses to ransom undermines prospects of a successful business rescue and recovery of amounts 
owed to creditors.75 This necessity for addressing imbalances in contractual relationships, to ensure 
the survival of businesses and increased returns to creditors, corresponds with the argument in this 
paper that the insolvency framework can play a part in regulating the practices of powerful 
commercial actors. Notably, given the historical role of soft law in regulating late payments,76 the 
Government considered that a code of conduct would be ineffective, taking account of the 
‘contractual nature’ of the relationships involved and the need to provide ‘the required degree of 
certainty surrounding continuity of supply’.77  The success/failure of any attempt to redress 
imbalances will thus be strongly affected by the type of response that is engaged. 
The SBEEA insolvency-related reforms, discussed below, were not premised on the objective of 
boosting small business interests.78 They are however relevant to smaller businesses on the basis that 
increased scope for pursuing transaction avoidance actions will have limited impact where it arises 
with respect to companies whose insolvency has resulted from the practices of larger trading partners, 
and/or the finances or assets of such companies have been eroded by such practices. As seen above, 
not all these forms of conduct can be redressed under measures of the type highlighted in the first 3 
paragraphs of this Section; and even where they are, smaller businesses may be reluctant to 
jeopardise significant trading relationships by invoking such remedies. The question therefore 
remains: how may large-debtor/small-creditor relationships be superintended to protect small 
business creditors from practices that hamper their solvency, reduce the amount available to pay their 
creditors in the event of formal proceedings; and run counter to conceptions of good business 
conduct, and deliberate efforts to improve the position of small businesses? The conjunction between 
the current reinforcement of small business interests, and the raised profile of the transaction 
avoidance regime, affords an opportunity to consider whether the demands of commercial morality 
should regulate the totality of trading arrangements, rather than remain confined to the remedies 
that are only potentially invocable in the event of the failure of a small business creditor. 
 
D. Significance of the SBEEA insolvency reforms  
                                                          
73 The Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies) Order 2015 Guidance for insolvency practitioners and 
suppliers (Insolvency Service, 2015), 1.5. 
74 Impact assessment: continuity of essential supplies to insolvent businesses (Insolvency Service, 2014), [49]-
[70]. 
75 Ibid, pp.1-2. 
76 Conway (n.53), 9-10; FSB, ‘Small firms have little confidence in the Prompt Payment Code, says FSB’ 
(19/03/15). 
77 Impact assessment (n.74), 1. 
78 Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK 
Business: Government Response (DBIS, 2014), [31], [262], [270]. 
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The investigative processes within the insolvency regime promote justice and fairness by enabling 
improper transactions entered into by the insolvent company, or improper conduct on the part of its 
directors and/or third parties, to be redressed.79 These functions have been enhanced by SBEEA 
changes affecting directors’ liability and vulnerable transactions. The first reform is that the power to 
bring actions for fraudulent/wrongful trading, previously enjoyed only by liquidators,80 has been 
extended to administrators.81  The second is that insolvency practitioners are now empowered to 
assign rights to pursue claims for fraudulent/wrongful trading, transactions at an undervalue, 
preferences and extortionate credit transactions.82 Hence, the fraudulent/wrongful trading remedies 
have been buttressed by their new application in the context of administration. They have 
furthermore been reinforced by the new ability of third party assignees to pursue fraudulent/wrongful 
trading claims, or the three voidable transaction remedies mentioned above, as a means of recovering 
funds or reversing transactions ‘where the directors and others have acted in a way that has caused 
harm to creditors’.83 These changes are harmonious, since claims concerning vulnerable transactions 
and wrongful trading, have often arisen in the same case.84 The potential impact of the changes is 
amplified by the principle that transaction at an undervalue, preference, and fraudulent trading 
remedies have extra-territorial effect.85 A virtuous circle is also identifiable between the power to 
challenge vulnerable transactions and to pursue claims for directors’ liability – the difficulty of 
establishing liability for wrongful trading can be a strong motivating factor for bringing a claim for a 
preference.86  
The IA 1986 provisions for overturning suspect transactions govern invalid dispositions (s.127), 
transactions at an undervalue (s.238), preferences (s.239), late floating charges (s.245), extortionate 
credit transactions (s.244) and transactions defrauding creditors (s.423). However, SBEEA reforms 
have only empowered administrators/liquidators to assign three causes of action: transactions at an 
undervalue, preferences and extortionate credit transactions. These three remedies are actions that 
can only be brought by an office-holder. The prominence accorded to transactions at an undervalue 
and preferences is especially apt in light of an empirical study investigating ‘how transaction avoidance 
provisions actually operate in practice’, published in 1998. The study found that preferences were the 
most common type of transaction encountered by insolvency practitioners,87 compared with 
transactions at an undervalue, invalid floating charges and transactions defrauding creditors.88 
Funding constraints meant that proceedings were rarely instituted, and the majority of cases 
concerning preferences were abandoned without settlement or settled before trial.89 The SBEEA 
reforms aimed at ensuring that ‘the causes of action which currently exist to protect creditors and 
                                                          
79 Cork Report (n.1) paragraphs 193-194, 198(h), 235(b)-239. 
80 Ss.213-214 IA 1986. 
81 Ss.246ZA-246ZB IA 1986 (s.117 SBEEA 2015). 
82 s.246ZD IA 1986 (s.118 SBEEA 2015). 
83 SBEEA, Explanatory Notes paragraph 713. 
84 Re Brian D. Pierson (Contractors) Limited [2001] 1 BCLC 275; Re Bangla Television Ltd [2006] EWHC 2292; 
Singla v Hedman [2010] EWHC 902. 
85 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [110], [214]; Re Paramount Airways (n.3). 
86 A. Keay, ‘Wrongful trading: problems and proposals’ (2014) 65 N.I.L.Q. 63, 79.  
87 R. Parry and D. Milman, ‘Transaction avoidance provisions in corporate insolvency: an empirical study’ 




secure financial redress’ are ‘more likely to be pursued’ if they are assigned to a third party90 have 
increased the scope for pursuit of such actions.  
The convergence between the SBEEA insolvency reforms and the drive to boost small business 
presents an opportune moment to assess whether the transaction avoidance regime can influence 
the development of standards that are beneficial for protecting smaller businesses. Conceivably, the 
pressure exerted by a larger trading partner can be one of the factors forming the background to a 
small business debtor’s financial distress, e.g. if its status as the largest customer91 causes delays in 
receiving payments to weaken the small business’s financial position.92  The integrity of insolvency law 
is affected insofar as the weakened financial position of smaller businesses as a result of such practices 
contributes to their financial distress, and (in the event of administration/liquidation) reduces the 
amount available to pay creditors. Two dimensions of the transaction avoidance regime resonate with 
difficulties of this nature. The first is that the investigation that is performed into the validity of 
transactions entered by the debtor is vital to upholding business standards and confidence in 
insolvency laws.93 The transaction avoidance regime thus forms part of the legal framework that exists 
for promoting high standards of business conduct. As seen in Section B, smaller businesses’ concerns 
related to the extent to which they felt compelled to concede to disadvantageous terms, and the 
struggle of challenging practices whereby funds were extracted from them or monies due to them 
were retained by powerful counterparties. Secondly, the transaction avoidance regime enables 
‘certain transactions between a debtor and other parties to be set aside in appropriate 
circumstances’.94 This raises the question whether undesirable arrangements between smaller and 
larger businesses may likewise be untangled. As demonstrated below, despite the congruence 
between this role of transaction avoidance law and the insolvency implications of challenges identified 
in Section B, it is unlikely that conventional avoidance mechanisms could reverse the types of 
arrangements that attracted negative publicity. The congruence does however invite reflection on the 
possibility of drawing on the jurisprudence surrounding   the transaction avoidance regime in order to 
devise standards aimed at improving the protection of smaller businesses.  
 
E. The limited capacity of transaction avoidance remedies to target sharp practices  
The proposition of finding ways to contest transactions between small businesses and larger trading 
partners fits with the transaction avoidance regime’s function to ‘preserve the company’s net asset 
value’.95 Indeed, Anderson has observed that there is a preponderance of transaction avoidance cases 
involving small companies.96 He has also noted that ‘transaction avoidance law overlaps with 
insolvency law but can also go wider’, and consequently is capable of intervening to control 
contractual conduct in circumstances where no insolvency proceedings are underway.97 Just as 
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transaction avoidance mechanisms control contractual conduct by ‘curb[ing] certain forms of debtor 
behaviour and … [imposing] some limits on the extent to which individual creditors can secure 
advantages through their own diligence’,98 the sort of problems identified in Section B point towards 
a need to curb practices of powerful debtors with respect to weaker creditors, and determine the 
extent to which such debtors can retain any advantages secured through these practices.   
The transaction avoidance provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 cannot be employed as direct 
weapons in the armoury available for protecting smaller businesses from any sharp practices by their 
larger trading partners, if the smaller business were to enter administration/liquidation proceedings.  
The first main reason for this is that some remedies operate only with respect to transactions where 
the insolvent company is in the position of debtor and its counterparty is a creditor. They consequently 
cannot apply to situations where a financially distressed smaller business is owed money by a trading 
partner and hence has creditor status, as in some of the instances chronicled in Section B. The second 
reason is that, even in relation to transaction avoidance remedies that govern transactions between 
an insolvent company and non-creditor parties, the circumstances of the trading relationship between 
the financially distressed smaller business and its larger partner may fall short of the essential 
requirements for establishing a cause of action.  Or at the very least, such circumstances may fit 
awkwardly within the ‘mould’ of that particular remedy, weakening the potential success of a claim 
by a liquidator/administrator/third party assignee. This point may be illustrated with reference to 
transactions at an undervalue.  
A transaction at an undervalue involves a company making a gift to a person or entering into a 
transaction, on the terms that the company will not receive any consideration, or will receive 
consideration of a significantly lower value than the value of the consideration it has provided. The 
company must have entered into the transaction at ‘a relevant time’: within two years of the onset of 
insolvency,99 when it was unable to pay its debts or became unable to pay its debts as a result of 
entering into the transaction.100 S.238 IA 1986 ‘is concerned with the depletion of a company's assets 
by transactions at an undervalue’,101 its obvious purpose being ‘to restore to a company … money or 
other assets which ought not to have left the company’.102 This view has also been expressed with 
respect to ss.588FB and 588FC of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, that their ‘purpose or object 
… is to prevent a depletion of the assets of a company which is being wound up by … “transactions at 
an under-value” entered into within a specified limited time prior to the commencement of the 
winding up’.103 Some practices highlighted in Section B, e.g. unpaid debts, unilateral deductions from 
amounts owed, data errors resulting in creditors being overcharged or underpaid, seemingly fit this 
description – especially where creditors eventually abandoned their claims for repayment or accepted 
lower amounts in settlement of their claims.104 A brief comparison between the value obtained by the 
company for the transaction and the value of the consideration provided by the company suggests 
that these transactions were at an undervalue. As regards the resulting inability to pay debts, 
withholding of payments significantly affects the cash flow of small businesses – to the extent of 
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forcing them to use overdraft facilities, fearing that they might breach covenants with their banks or 
finding themselves obliged to seek bridging loans or additional finance from their parent companies.105 
The consonance between these practices and the transaction at an undervalue remedy is reinforced 
by the decision, in an Australian case applying the s.588FB remedy, that the forgiveness of a debt 
amounts to an ‘uncommercial transaction’.106 The court had regard to the Explanatory Memorandum 
of the legislation introducing s.588FB,107 which records that s.588FB ‘is specifically aimed at preventing 
companies disposing of assets or other resources through transactions which resulted in the recipient 
receiving a gift or obtaining a bargain of such magnitude that it could not be explained by normal 
commercial practice’.108 
Prima facie, it is therefore possible for the waiver of a debt owed to an insolvent small business to be 
regarded as a transaction at an undervalue. Yet, it is disputable whether depletion of a small business’s 
assets resulting from non-payment or underpayments by larger debtors, or forced over-payments by 
the small business to such debtors, constitutes transactions that a small company has ‘entered into’ 
under s.238.109 This is borne out by the recent case of Re Ovenden Colbert Printers Ltd,110 where it was 
held that the expression ‘entered into’ in s.238 ‘connotes the taking of some step or act of 
participation by the company’, for it to be a party to the transaction or involved in it.111 This outcome 
weakens the ability of the transaction avoidance regime, at the core of which lies the principle of 
‘commercial morality’,112 to act as an instrument of deterring or policing the kinds of financial 
appropriation which small businesses may experience at the hands of large counterparties.  
Although factors such as these put traditional transaction avoidance remedies out of reach, it would 
be unproductive to focus on applying existing remedies or developing new ones, since a problem 
highlighted with regards to late payments and unfair terms affecting smaller businesses is reluctance 
to invoke remedies against prominent counterparties.113  Secondly, an emphasis on protection ex ante 
insolvency would be more supportive of the needs of commercial morality and business rescue, and 
of the agenda to promote small business interests outlined in Section C, than ex post responses 
provided by transaction avoidance remedies. All the same, there is some resonance between the role 
of the transaction avoidance regime to prevent commercial immorality and the dissipation of assets,114 
and the ways in which trading conduct which attracts unfavourable publicity and/or formal censure 
for large enterprises also strains the finances of small business counterparties. This lends weight to 
the idea that the jurisprudence surrounding the transaction avoidance regime can be cultivated for 
the purpose of safeguarding smaller businesses. This question is approached from two angles: in 
Section F, starting from the premise that transaction avoidance remedies are viewed through the 
prism of restraining the debtor’s actions with respect to its creditors, proposing that there is scope for 
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developing analogous principles to protect small business creditors by imposing duties on their 
powerful debtors – thereby reducing the small creditors’ risk of insolvency and encouraging the 
maintenance of high business standards. In Section G, noting that inasmuch as transaction avoidance 
law acknowledges the need to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transactions,115 any intervention 
aimed at reviewing/adjusting trading relationships between smaller and larger businesses should be 
tempered by an understanding of the circumstances in which seemingly disadvantageous 
arrangements may in fact be desirable from the weaker counterparty’s perspective.  
 
F. Proposing a set of standards to control the conduct of a smaller business’s counterparty 
As seen above, techniques that have emerged in response to late payments problems and risks 
surrounding continuity of essential supplies circumscribe the power that a stronger counterparty 
enjoys by virtue of the terms of a contract, the niche nature of its products/services,116 or its financial 
clout as a customer.117 Prevention of ‘abuse of a dominant position’ is familiar to the field of 
competition law, which places controls on conduct of undertakings that command substantial market 
power.118 It is arguably a suitable corollary of preventing dominant undertakings from engaging in 
illegitimate practices with respect to their competitors, that their excesses as debtor/customer 
counterparties should also be curbed. Parallels with the circumstances described in Section B include 
the notion that an undertaking may be accountable for abusing its dominance in the capacity of a 
purchaser of goods/services.119 This is also a context in which it is vital to distinguish between 
legitimate (non-abusive) conduct and illegitimate conduct.120  In FENIN v Commission, the contention 
that ‘systematic delays in payment’ constitute an abuse of a dominant position, failed on the ground 
that the purchasing entities did not constitute ‘undertakings’ within the scope of the prohibition in 
European Union law.121 In Land Rover Group Ltd v UPF (UK) Ltd, an application for an injunction 
securing the continued supply of goods, the court had difficulty applying the abuse of dominance 
prohibition to circumstances where there was no evident ‘market’ and the goal was to regulate the 
single commercial relationship of a particular seller and a particular buyer.122 It more willingly accepted 
that fiduciary duties could arise within a contractual setting, for parties to exercise contractual rights 
in good faith, and ‘not to exploit the dependency created by the relationship for either party’s own 
advantage’.123 The outcomes of these cases underscore the value of having rules which are applicable 
in situations that fall short of the requirements of existing prohibitions.  
Not only is the substance of such rules important, it is crucial to consider what form they should take. 
A contrast may be drawn between the reasoning behind recent legislative reforms regarding 
continuity of essential supplies (that a non-legislative code would not provide the required amount of 
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certainty),124 and the way in which the GCA’s investigation report had the effect of improving a major 
supermarket operator’s compliance with the Groceries Supply Code of Practice and relationships with 
suppliers.125 This latter outcome suggests that standards with enforcement ‘bite’, which are not 
restricted to a single sector (given the breadth of the practices described in Section B) could improve 
the balance between the interests of smaller and larger businesses. A persuasive argument for greater 
State involvement in the development of commercial norms has previously been advanced in the 
transaction avoidance context.126 State intervention is justifiable in situations where powerful 
commercial actors lack incentives to treat smaller counterparties fairly. The arguments below are 
therefore presented on the basis that for any obligations formulated below to have an impact, they 
require State backing in the form of transparent enforcement mechanisms.127  
 
F.(i) Standard 1: A larger trading partner’s behaviour should be constrained where the 
financial risk to the smaller business proportionately outweighs the payoff to the larger firm 
Within the transaction avoidance arena, provisions such as s.238 IA 1986 respond to ‘perverse 
incentives experienced by debtors facing financial distress’.128 However as seen in Section B,  powerful 
debtors of a (potentially) financially distressed company have incentives to extract value from its 
estate through failure to pay debts, delays in payment, underpayments or erroneous payments – 
especially as a strategy to secure preferable trading terms. Loss of value to a financially distressed 
company’s debtor counterparties is detrimental to the interests of its shareholders as well as its 
creditors (i.e. it does not benefit the former at the expense of the latter); compared with the settled 
view that transactions at an undervalue tend to benefit an insolvent company’s shareholders, who 
may be inclined to ‘bet the firm’ on high risk projects.129 The Cork Committee recognised suppliers of 
goods and services as involuntary creditors, bound by trade custom to extend credit facilities and 
‘sometimes unable to exercise credit control’.130 Small business suppliers that lack diversity in product 
offerings and customer base, and find themselves buffeted by intense price competition,131 hold a 
weaker bargaining position with regards to larger counterparties. This is more pronounced where 
enterprises with a very large market share in certain sectors constitute ‘unavoidable business 
partner[s]’ in those markets.132 
It is therefore necessary to prevent the depletion of a small business’s assets through transfers of 
wealth that occur as a result of the practices of its larger trading partners. A principle which seeks to 
control value-depleting actions by larger firms in their dealings with smaller businesses would be 
engaged where the financial risk to the smaller business proportionately outweighs the payoff gained 
by the larger firm’s practices.   This resembles the perverse incentive imputed to financially distressed 
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companies regarding transactions at an undervalue, that they may move the company’s assets 
towards ‘high-risk, high payoff activities’.133  A standard that can be framed and measured in these 
financial terms is capable of providing an effective test compared to the variety of existing checks on 
the trading behaviour of larger businesses (such as the mandatory or voluntary disclosure of payment 
practices, prompt payment codes and the regulation of late payments134). 
 
F.(ii) Standard 2: A larger trading partner should be constrained from seeking/exploiting 
transfers or advantages that are given by the smaller business, at the expense of the latter’s 
responsibilities to its creditors or other trading partners 
S.239 IA 1986, governing preferences, targets transactions whereby a company ‘does anything or 
suffers anything to be done which … has the effect of putting [a creditor] into a position which, in the 
event of the company going into insolvent liquidation, will be better than the position he would have 
been in if that thing had not been done’.135 Although the remedy clearly cannot be brought to bear on 
situations where the beneficiary of a transfer is a debtor rather than a creditor of the insolvent 
company, a trading partner that has retained monies belonging to a now-insolvent company is 
evidently in a better position than it would otherwise have enjoyed, in the event of the company’s 
liquidation. A preference embraces ‘a wide range of transactions or dealings’,136 including the 
insolvent company’s release of its counterparty’s obligations;137 and a preference may arise where a 
company ‘suffers anything to be done’ that puts the creditor in a better position than they would 
otherwise have enjoyed. Thus there may be a thin dividing line in terms of facts triggering s.239, and 
those falling outside the scope of the provision due to the insolvent company occupying the position 
of creditor rather than debtor.  
This reasoning, that it is improper for a debtor to honour a single creditor’s claims when it is insolvent 
or about to become so,138 could be extended to transactions between a small business and non-
creditor counterparties. It would take the form of a principle rendering it objectionable to seek 
transfers which impede the small business’s ability to fulfil commitments to other trading partners or 
fulfil its obligations to its creditors. Withholding of payments can severely affect small businesses’ cash 
flow,139 and in sectors where it is apparent that a large counterparty swiftly receives payments from 
its own customers, it cannot easily justify withholding funds due to the smaller business for an 
inordinately long time.140  The large counterparty can consequently be deemed to be acting with 
awareness that it is squeezing the smaller business – especially if the large enterprise tends to engage 
in poor payment practices with smaller counterparties more consistently than it does with its own 
large trading partners.141 Hence the imposition of a standard on larger trading partners, preventing 
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them from seeking or benefiting from transfers/advantages provided by the smaller business, at the 
expense of the latter’s responsibilities to its creditors or its other trading partners, is warranted. This 
standard has the advantage of being somewhat measurable, since it assesses the impact of transfers 
on the smaller business’s capacity to satisfy contractual/financial commitments. The FSB has 
highlighted the potential for payments technology to play a more prominent role in addressing late 
payments problems, e.g. through generating ‘nudge’ reminders to debtors to settle outstanding 
accounts.142 This technology could also be adapted to alert large debtors of impending perils to a 
smaller business’s finances, caused by their non-payment/underpayment, without obliging a small 
business to fully disclose its financial position. In long-term business relationships, these alerts would 
gradually increase the larger business’s consciousness of these ‘pinch points’, and its ability to avoid 
exerting them on the small business. 
 
G. Preventing a ‘blunt-instrument approach’ to applying new standards 
As argued above, while substantive transaction avoidance mechanisms are not inherently suited to 
the task of challenging the types of contractual arrangements outlined in the introductory part of this 
paper, precepts associated with the remedies provide a source from which some expectations 
regarding the conduct of larger businesses (particularly as debtors) may be drawn.  
At the same time, it is dangerous to assume that all contractual arrangements between smaller 
businesses and their larger trading partners, especially those which come about through the latter’s 
exercise of significant financial/negotiating power, should attract the same level of scrutiny. 
Contracting parties may have an interest in seeing that the outcome of a rigorous (yet unequal) 
exchange is respected, in similar manner to the emphasis placed upon the concept of predictability 
within the transaction avoidance regime.143 Governmental consultations on the regulating late 
payment practices have noted concern that measures to reduce late payment would impinge on 
freedom of contract.144 Thus, standards aimed at controlling the trading behaviour of large 
commercial actors should not focus exclusively on constraints, but should also be capable of signalling 
the types of transactions that would elicit positive responses from smaller businesses’ perspective. 
Hence – as considered under the following subheadings – the controlling effect of Standards 1 and 2 
should be complemented by indicia of the factors that are useful in affirming the propriety of the 
dealings between a smaller business and its larger trading partners.  
The importance of adopting a nuanced approach to questioning contractual arrangements is 
reinforced by an insight from the GCA’s investigation report, that a large grocery retailer’s staff often 
used prospective repayment of debts owed to a supplier ‘as a bargaining tool to encourage suppliers 
to make proposals for the next trading year’.145 Suppliers’ responses ranged from believing ‘that they 
achieved a good deal out of these negotiations’,146 to accepting the proposed terms under pressure 
‘in order to ensure they received something in return for money that they had feared that they would 
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not recover’147 (even waiving amounts they believed were owed to them, rather than continue difficult 
negotiations and risk damaging a long-term relationship).148 The report cites the example of a supplier 
who agreed to invest more than half of a multi-million pound debt that it was owed into the next 
trading period, once this amount had been repaid.149 Suppliers commonly offered to ‘fund future 
activities on condition that outstanding debts were repaid’.150 
This opens up the broader question of where a line can be drawn, in devising standards, between 
concessions that have been tendered by small businesses willingly as a result of negotiations, and 
concessions that represent an admission of defeat on the part of smaller businesses. It echoes the 
attention given in transaction avoidance law to whether ‘bargained for advantages … are an 
acceptable means of [preserving] a creditor’s position’.151 The transaction avoidance regime, which 
involves a balancing act between striking down transactions and facilitating ‘economically desirable’ 
activity,152 recognises that not all prima facie suspect transactions should be overturned. For example, 
a disposition of a company’s property after the commencement of winding up proceedings, which 
would otherwise be void, may be validated in circumstances where the transaction ‘in the interests of 
the creditors as a whole’.153 Similarly, a transaction at an undervalue will be upheld if the debtor 
entered into it in good faith for the purpose of carrying on its business, with reasonable grounds for 
believing it would benefit the company;154 and a transaction conferring a preference will only be 
overturned if the debtor was influenced by a desire to improve the position of a particular creditor.155 
Late floating charges granted by a debtor will be upheld insofar as they have been exchanged for 
consideration in the form of money, goods, services, or reduction/discharge of debts owed by the 
company.156 Walters notes that ‘wider issues of policy within commercial law and the credit economy’, 
‘such as the need to promote finality of transactions or to encourage the provision of credit to 
struggling or potentially viable businesses’, detract from the collective scheme provided by insolvency 
law.157 Likewise, it is appropriate, in formulating affirmative rather than restraining principles, to 
explore what imperatives can form the basis of a suitable differentiation between beneficial and 
disadvantageous arrangements/transactions.  
 
G.(i) Standard 3:  Arrangements that are free from counterparty threats/pressure may be 
condoned 
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As indicated in the previous paragraph, the question of the debtor company’s good faith arises in 
relation to transactions at an undervalue and preferences. It is an element that is especially pertinent 
to small companies, where the controllers’ state of mind is easier to ascertain.158  
With respect to transactions at an undervalue,159 an insolvent company’s good faith is attached to the 
question whether it acted with the purpose of carrying on the company’s business.160  In instances of 
the type sketched in Section B, the idea of having acted in good faith to ensure continuation of the 
company’s business could be supported where small businesses are satisfied with gains from their 
negotiated exchange with a larger trading partner and regard any concessions they have made as 
worthwhile consideration for the preservation of a significant trading relationship and future benefits 
accruing from it. On the other hand, where a smaller business finds itself subject to implacable 
pressure to waive all or part of its trading partner’s indebtedness, it is more difficult to ascribe a good 
faith belief to both parties that the contractual arrangements under scrutiny would ultimately be 
beneficial for the smaller business. This lack of good faith could, for example, be evinced by board 
level decisions by a (smaller) supplier company not to pursue debts owed by a (larger) retailer 
following indications by the retailer that the supplier’s ‘future business … was at risk’ if it continued to 
press for repayment.161   
Queries regarding whether contractual arrangements have been entered into freely also arise in 
relation to preferences. An insolvent company’s good faith is dependent on whether it ‘was influenced 
… by a desire’ to confer a preference on a particular creditor,162 i.e. if it ‘positively wished to improve 
the creditor's position in the event of its own insolvent liquidation’. 163 Two facets of this essential 
element of preferential transactions echo problems encountered in the context of relationships 
between small businesses and their large trading partners, with regards to distinguishing between 
transactions which should be revisited and those which should be respected.  One is that an insolvent 
company would not be seen as having sought to improve a creditor’s position if it conferred a 
preference to enable its struggling business to continue.164 Another relevant facet is that the desire to 
improve a particular creditor’s position is seen as lacking where the preference has come about as a 
result of the insolvent yielding to the creditor’s demands/pressure.165 This is described as a ‘structural 
bias’ of English preference law ‘in favour of diligent creditors who actively press for recovery of their 
debts’,166 specifically ‘large corporate or institutional creditors’ who have greater bargaining power.167 
Against this backdrop, it may be asked whether corresponding principles can be developed to 
determine if advantages secured by a larger debtor from its smaller creditor may be seen as legitimate, 
e.g. if good faith may be inferred from the presence/absence of pressure in their contractual 
arrangements. This is especially important as a relationship with a large customer can provide the 
factual background behind a small business’s conferment of a preference on a powerful creditor, as 
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seen in ‘the seminal case on preferences’ under IA 1986,168 Re MC Bacon Ltd.169 This case illustrates 
the insolvency risks of a small business’s efforts to gratify a significant trading partner, and supports 
the notion that good faith can be tested according to whether the small business succumbed to a 
stronger party’s demands. A company in financial difficulties granted security to its bank to prevent 
the closure of its overdraft facility and continue trading. The bank was ultimately successful in 
defending its receipt of this preference, since the small business debtor had not been motivated by 
any desire to improve the bank’s position in the event of insolvent liquidation. However, the bank was 
called upon to defend the transaction as a result of its small business debtor’s own relationship with 
its major customer. The small business had scaled down its decade-old line of business in the 
production of traditional bacon and ‘diversified into the supply of pre-packaged manufactured 
products’ to fulfil the needs of this customer whose business represented almost 60% of its 
turnover.170 When the customer abruptly withdrew its business, the small business failed to regain its 
former level of sales, and incurred substantial losses before entering liquidation less than one year 
later.171 The small business, which had not needed to provide any security for its overdraft when it 
was trading profitably in the past, became obliged to tender a debenture in exchange for the bank’s 
continued support, following a sharp increase in its indebtedness within months of losing this main 
customer.172 Thus, the consequences of such small business failures may reach lenders who have to 
justify the steps taken to protect their position in s.239 proceedings. As the creditor’s successful 
defence of its security in Re MC Bacon is perceived to have become a dissuasive factor in liquidators’ 
decisions to pursue avoidance actions,173 regulating small creditor/large debtor relationships could 
pre-empt instances of the financial extremity in which small businesses must yield to their large 
creditors’ self-protection techniques. 
Doubts have been expressed regarding the courts’ inclination to uphold transactions where pressure 
has been brought to bear by the recipient of the preference.174 By contrast, Standard 3 proposes that 
the presence of threats/pressure should provide a ground for revisiting transactions with a view to 
potential adjustment/renegotiation, rather than a defence. As a form of good-faith ground for 
scrutinizing contractual arrangements entered into between a small business and large counterparties 
where advantages conferred on the latter are a product of threats/pressure, it would be more 
protective of small business creditors facing financial ruin. 
 
 
G.(ii) Standard 4: Transactions/arrangements entered into for the purpose of preventing 
closure of the business may be condoned 
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As seen under the previous heading, the question of an insolvent company’s good faith is closely linked 
to the aim of carrying on the company’s business. Since the aim of continuing an insolvent company’s 
business constitutes a key factor in decisions concerning the validation of vulnerable transactions, 
independently from the issue of good faith, it can provide a useful means of distinguishing between 
arrangements that have facilitated the continuation of the smaller company’s business, and 
arrangements that endanger the survival of its business. 
Small businesses that are limited in their choice of trading partners, may take the view that extending 
credit on disadvantageous terms outweighs the potential consequences of losing a major 
counterparty. This can arise where a trading partner is the largest customer for a significant proportion 
of suppliers, accounting for as much as one-quarter of their overall business,175 or is an inescapable 
business partner within certain markets.176 A similar perception of the value of continuing the 
company’s business is identified with the remedy for transactions at an undervalue. Even where 
requirements for a s.238 claim have been met, the court will not exercise its discretion to grant a 
remedy if the insolvent company evidently would not have been better off if it had refrained from 
entering into the transaction. This recognises that a company on the verge of collapse,177 which would 
have had to close down its business if it had not received the lower consideration which gave rise to 
the s.238 claim, would be in a worse financial condition if it had not entered into the transaction at an 
undervalue.178 
The ability to continue the company’s business is a key factor in relation to other transaction 
avoidance mechanisms besides preferences and transactions at an undervalue.  A principle governing 
the approval of dispositions of the company’s property made after winding-up proceedings have 
commenced,179 is that ‘it may sometimes be beneficial to the company and its creditors that the 
company should be able to continue the business in its ordinary course’ by disposing of some of its 
property.180  Similarly, floating charges granted by a debtor company within a certain period preceding 
its insolvency are only valid insofar as they secure money, goods, or services, or any 
reduction/discharge of the company’s debts supplied or effected by the charge at the time of creation 
of the charge.181 Security which enables a company to continue its business is accordingly prized over 
security which secures past indebtedness of the insolvent company.182   
On this basis, burdensome arrangements between small business creditors and their larger debtors 
should be respected, if they provide a means of averting the collapse of the small business creditor, in 
the interests of all parties potentially affected by such failure. Ideally under Standard 4, it would be 
possible to establish that the arrangements at issue have been pivotal in promoting the survival of the 
small business creditor, e.g. by mitigating its reliance on overdraft or lending facilities or enabling the 
small business to avoid defaulting on payment to its own creditors. This reasoning, that arrangements 
entered into for the purpose of ensuring continuation of the company’s business are treated as 
legitimate, emulates the outlook (in the transaction avoidance context) that creditors are willing to 
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forego any entitlement to equal treatment, in the interests of their debtor carrying on business as 
usual.183 
 
G.(iii) Standard 5: Transactions/arrangements which are in line with enforceable public 
standards/codes may be condoned 
The point has been expressed, concerning late payments issues, that responses should target the 
culture of poor practice.184 In the realm of relationships between small businesses and large 
counterparties, the ‘normalcy’ of commercial practices works against small businesses insofar as 
payment terms ‘are typically imposed upon [them] rather than negotiated’.185 Furthermore, various 
practices distort ideas of what constitutes conduct in the ordinary course of business. These include 
the prevalence of payments outside agreed contract terms (for which responsibility is chiefly 
attributed to large private businesses),186 and ‘bullying’ trends within supply chains through practices 
such as demands for supplier investment payments and withholding funds owed to suppliers by 
unilaterally deducting discounts.187 The setting of fixed payment periods by small business creditors 
does not preclude their large debtors from demanding lengthy payment terms.188   
On the other hand, an element in the development of transaction avoidance law has been to gauge 
the legitimacy of transactions depending on whether they occurred ‘in a course of dealing and 
trade’.189 This concept has played a role in discerning what constitutes acceptable commercial 
conduct. For example, in distinguishing between situations where a payment has been made or an act 
has been performed ‘in pursuance of a prior agreement’,190 and those where the object of the 
insolvent’s payment or action is to improve the position of a creditor.191 
The problems thrown up by using the ‘ordinary course of business’ to test the legitimacy of 
transactions between commercial actors may be seen from its implementation in modern common 
law jurisdictions such as the United States. This defence for transactions conferring a preference, that 
the transaction occurred in the ordinary course of the particular relationship between the debtor and 
the creditor, or that it falls within the range of terms applicable to a given industry,192 is described as 
the most litigated preference defence.193 Ascertaining whether a payment has been made in the 
ordinary course of business involves a factual investigation,194 and the flexibility with which this 
defence is applied appears from decisions holding that a transaction may be treated as being in the 
ordinary course of a particular debtor/creditor business relationship even if it was a one-time 
                                                          
183 Tabb (n.115), 418. 
184 Conway, (n.53) 32-33; CBI, Response (n.53) [2]; FSB, (n.36) 35-36; CIMA, ‘It’s Time to Change the Payment 
Culture’ (1998) 76 Management Accounting 28.   
185 FSB, ibid 34.  
186 Ibid 6. 
187 Ibid, 16-18.  
188 Ibid, 18; Conway, (n.53) 30, 32; CBI, Response (n.53) [13]-[14]. 
189 Harman v Fishar (1774) 1 Cowper 117, 123. 
190 Ibid, 125. 
191 Rust v Cooper (1777) 2 Cowper 629, 634. 
192 US Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 Chapter 5 U.S.C. §547(c)(2); Re Tolona Pizza Products (1993) 3 F.3d 1029. 
193 B. Kotliar, ‘A New Reading of the Ordinary Course of Business Exception in Section 547(c)(2)’ (2013) 21 
Am.Bankr.Inst.L.Rev. 211. 
194 Re Paradise Valley Holdings, Inc (2006) 347 B.R. 304, 310. 
 22 
transaction,195 or events which occurred during the preference period had never previously occurred 
in the parties’ shared history.196 In considering whether a transaction is ‘ordinary’ in the sense that it 
complies with widespread industry standards,197 courts have held that only transactions which are so 
unusual or uncommon as to constitute ‘an aberration’198 or ‘a gross departure’199 from prevailing 
industry practices will be regarded as preferential. Although effects-based preference remedies such 
as the U.S. model200 are regarded as providing more certainty through an objective approach,201 there 
is difficulty in anticipating when a preference will be overturned.202 Preferential transactions are 
furthermore susceptible to manipulation in that recipients of payments are encouraged to adopt 
mathematical methods of calculating and presenting their ordinary course of business defence, and 
thereby strengthen their position in litigation or negotiations with a bankruptcy trustee.203 Larger 
creditors who are well-resourced to conduct such strategic analyses, will be better placed to retain 
the benefits of preferential transactions. Thus, conceptions of ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ conduct can be 
somewhat malleable in the transaction avoidance context itself. 
As seen from Section B, some commonplace commercial practices are underlain by an imbalance of 
negotiating power that small businesses would be unlikely to accept as normal. Industry norms play a 
limited role in this type of setting if, for example, the formal material provided to a large organisation’s 
employees conforms to relevant industry code(s), but the contents of the material are not followed 
consistently, and employees are occasionally instructed to act in contravention of the code(s).204  
While this casts some doubt on the extent to which industry norms are capable of controlling the 
behaviour of larger market actors, it is notable that the publication of the GCA’s investigation report 
into a supermarket operator’s practices is associated with improved relationships with suppliers and 
compliance with the Groceries Supply Code of Practice.205 The FSB has highlighted this example, in 
arguing that negative publicity of poor practices can spur behavioural change on the part of companies 
that are ‘named and shamed’;206  a technique currently used to improve employers’ adherence to their 
duty to pay minimum wages.207 Thus, Standard 5 is formulated on the basis that mechanisms such as 
industry codes make a useful contribution to determining what constitutes acceptable commercial 
conduct, provided that they are capable of enforcement in the public eye.  
                                                          
195 Re Express Factors, Inc. 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2156, 26-29.  
196 Re Roberds, Inc. (2004) 315 B.R. 443, 546-457; Re Tri-Union Development Corp. (2006) 349 B.R. 145, 150.  
197 US Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 Chapter 5 U.S.C. §547(c)(2)(B); Re Globe Manufacturing Corporation (2009) 
567 F.3d 1291, 1298. 
198 Re Carled, Inc. (1996) 91 F.3d 811, 818. 
199 Re Kevco, Inc. 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1249, 76. 
200 Cork Report (n.1), paragraph 1256. 
201 Keay (n.168), 33; Leow (n.151), [35]-[46]; S. Quo, ‘Insolvency law: a comparative analysis of the preference 
tests in the UK and Australia’ 2007 Co.Law 355. 
202 B. Gotberg, ‘Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: the Need for Different Rules in Different 
Chapters’ [2014] 100 Iowa L.Rev 51, 57.  
203 K. Winiecki, ‘Defending Preference Actions: Optimal Strategies for Comprehensive Mathematical Analyses’ 
(2006) 25-8 ABIJ 18; G. Abrams, J. Steinfeld and J. Hess, ‘Prosecuting Preference Actions Post-BAPCPA: Another 
View Toward a Reliable Statistical Model’ (2006/2007) 25-10 ABIJ 5; Tabb (n.115), 421-422.  
204 GCA (n.14), [31.12]. 
205 A. Allen, ‘How the GCA’s Tesco investigation changed supplier relations’ Supply Management (15 December 
2015). 
206 FSB (n.36), 19, 28. 




The vulnerability of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is associated with access to credit, an 
environment in which freedom of contract favours lenders’ exercise of stronger bargaining power.208 
While the SBEEA has sought to enhance SMEs’ access to credit, the fact remains that where creditors’ 
bargaining power is taken to the extreme, the squeezing of a financially distressed debtor can diminish 
the assets available to meet the claims of the general body of creditors. However, a comparable 
danger, illuminated by news coverage of the problems affecting small businesses and soft/hard law 
responses to the problem of late payments, is that SMEs may be squeezed in a variety of ways by their 
own large debtors.  
Despite the strengthening of some transaction avoidance remedies through SBEEA reforms, these 
challenges for small businesses undercut the argument that while a debtor is a going concern, it freely 
makes choices regarding settlement of its creditors’ claims,209 and the transaction avoidance regime 
steps in to prevent a race to seize the debtor’s assets once it becomes insolvent.210 This reasoning 
over-estimates the level of choice that smaller businesses have, with regards to making payments 
from their resources, as seen from the discussion in Section B. Trading conditions of the nature 
outlined in Section B are not only troubling for individual small businesses, but have an impact on the 
economy insofar as poor practices lead to business failure.211 Moreover, in circumstances where 
questionable arrangements cannot be prevented or remedied, existing transaction avoidance 
mechanisms are likely to be engaged in relation to insolvent smaller businesses that have 
progressively lost value during the course of their trading life as a result of practices they have 
encountered.  
Transaction avoidance jurisprudence nevertheless offers useful insights regarding ways in which the 
legitimacy of prima facie suspect arrangements might be tested, and these have informed the 
formulation of the proposed Standards 1-5. Raising business standards that are relevant to the 
operation of companies while they are going concerns would lessen the incidence of small business 
failures caused by the strain of unequal trading relationships, and bolster the insolvency regime’s 
objectives of preserving viable enterprises212 and upholding commercial morality.213 Behavioural 
standards that operate as a combination of enforceable constraints and guides to commendable 
actions also respond to concern that measures targeting payment practices have been inadequate in 
changing the culture affecting small businesses in the UK.214 A fresh approach is needed, to bring about 
the level of culture change that generates a discernible shift in the imbalance of power between small 
businesses and their larger trading partners. 
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